On November 27, a coalition of armed opposition groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched an offensive against government-held positions in northwestern Syria’s Aleppo and Idlib provinces. Less than two weeks later, they entered Damascus as President Bashar al-Assad and his family exited in an unknown direction.
The collapse of the Syrian government army was spectacular. It brings to mind similar devastation in Afghanistan – when the Taliban seized Kabul from the Afghan government after the withdrawal of US troops – and in Iraq, when ISIL (ISIS) attacked in 2014 and other parts of Iraq. Captured the big city of Mosul. day
The successes of the HTS, the Taliban and Daesh (ISIS) were due to their mobilization and internal cohesion – or ‘asabiyyah’ as the Arab historian Ibn Khaldun called it – to the failures of their opponents. . Networks of patronage and corruption dominated the Syrian army just as they did in Iraq and Afghanistan, making it unstable and ineffective without the support of foreign forces.
This, in addition to Assad’s weak rule, the lack of legitimacy and the government’s unpopularity ensured the Syrian army’s inability to counter the advance of organized armed groups.
Patronage and low morale: For years, the Syrian opposition has been fractured and infighting, with the Syrian government losing ground. After 2020, the conflict was largely considered ‘frozen’, allowing the opposition, particularly HTS, to consolidate and regroup. Despite many years of setbacks, he did not lose hope and courage to fight against the Syrian government.
This ensured a sense of internal cohesion, which Ibn Khaldun identified in the 14th century as a key factor that made a tribal force strong enough to take over entire kingdoms. He drew this conclusion while observing the advance of the Mongol leader Timur, who conquered not only Central Asia but also parts of India, Persia, Iraq and Anatolia.
In 1400, his forces captured Aleppo and then made a lightning assault on Hama and Homs. Ultimately, Damascus surrendered to Timur without a fight in December 1400, the unpopular Mamluk sultan fleeing the city in shock.
In the case of the Syrian opposition, their morale was boosted not only by internal solidarity but also by the idea that they were fighting for national liberation.
On the contrary, the morale of the Syrian army was low. Its ranks were mostly conscripts, some of whom had been forced into service after arrest and torture.
Thus the 130,000 strong Syrian troops stood little chance against the advancing 30,00 rebel fighters. The army disintegrated just as the 300,000-strong Afghan army faced a Taliban army of 60,000 fighters, and just as the 30,000-strong Iraqi army did when 1,500 ISIS fighters attacked Mosul.
In reality, large numbers mask structural deficiencies. The Syrian army – like the Iraqi and Afghan – was mired in corruption and had a significant problem with ‘ghost soldiers’. This trend refers to an inflated roster with fictitious names so officers can collect extra pay checks.
This practice emerged because the military operated as a patronage network where officers were given positions based on loyalty rather than military intelligence. These officers would then use their positions to gain wealth for themselves, either through these expensive rosters or by defrauding the civilian population.
Fall of a corrupt dynasty: When Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad – Bashar’s father – abandoned the Arab military alliance and unilaterally built up a large military force.
The Soviet Union provided it with a fleet of tanks, artillery, and aircraft, as well as ballistic Scud missiles, to deter its main enemy in the region, Israel. Syria also developed a chemical weapons program similar to Israel’s nuclear weapons.
However, these weapons have never been used in conventional warfare against the Israeli army. Instead this massive military force was unleashed against the Syrian population – first under Hafez during the Hama uprising and then under Bashar during the 2011 Syrian revolution.
Weapons designed to inflict serious damage on the Israeli military were turned against Syrian civilians. Assad even fired his long-range ballistic Scud missiles at Syrian cities.
When the army’s massacre of the Syrian people led to a massive defection campaign that cost half of its officers and soldiers, the Assad regime sought to import foreign forces to fight on its side. .
Lebanese fighters from Hezbollah and Russian fighters from the Wagner group of mercenaries were joined by various pro-Iranian armed groups and eventually some regular Russian forces.
While these foreign forces managed to push back rebel forces and secure the al-Assad regime, the latter made the fatal mistake of believing it could rule forever by brute force. He did nothing to try to regain legitimacy by offering good governance to his people. It provided few services and almost no security, as Syria’s economy continued to decline and living standards continued to decline. This carelessness is also reflected in the way the government treated the army. By 2023, soldiers were receiving bonuses of 10,000 Syrian lira or $0.75. Three days before his fall, al-Assad made a last-ditch effort to boost morale by increasing army pay by 50 percent. But it did not prove to have any effect.
After waging a decade-long war against its own people, the Syrian army is no longer willing to wage another decade-long war in 2024. With no foreign forces nearby to fight on Assad’s behalf, Syrian forces retreated. City after city until the rebels captured Damascus. The army disappeared into thin air as its soldiers trashed their military uniforms and donned civilian clothes. As Ibn Khaldun observed nearly 700 years ago, corruption can kill the Asabiyyah and quickly destroy entire families. Al-Assad clearly had not learned much from his country’s history.
Courtesy: Al Jazeera.com