The ceasefire in Gaza, due to begin tomorrow, will bring welcome relief from daily violence but amounts, at present, to little more than a fragile, temporary pause in a conflict that is far from over. Israel has not achieved its principal war aim, as defined by its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu: the total elimination of Hamas. Nor has Hamas achieved its objective: the destruction of Israel. The leaders responsible for the 7 October 2023 terrorist atrocities are dead. The organisation’s capabilities are severely reduced. But it has survived – which its supporters claim is a victory for Palestinian sumud (steadfastness).
Most of the 98 remaining Israeli hostages, alive and dead, will not be freed in this first phase of the ceasefire, which is to last for six weeks. There is no agreed “day after” strategy for devastated Gaza, where nearly 47,000 Palestinians have died and where the hungry and mostly homeless residents exist in a state of near-anarchy, plagued by criminal gangs. And there is nothing in sight that remotely resembles what the Americans call a “pathway to peace” – a long-term plan to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict on the basis of two independent, sovereign states.
The success of Qatari, Egyptian and US negotiators in achieving this vital first step should not be underestimated. But neither should the huge difficulties that remain. Netanyahu is at the centre of a political storm largely of his own making. Deeply unpopular with at least half of the electorate, accused of neglect in failing to prevent the 7 October attacks, and on trial on corruption charges, he has used the war to stay in power and out of jail. His cynical coalition deals with extremist far-right nationalist and religious party leaders now threaten to sink him.
Two of these leaders, Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, voted against the ceasefire, which they deem a “deal with the devil”. If they withdraw their parties’ support, Netanyahu’s government could face collapse and early elections. At the same time, he is under pressure from US president-elect Donald Trump to end the war. Trump scorns Palestinian rights and statehood. His priorities are Israel-Saudi normalisation, along the lines of the Abraham accords, and the diplomatic defanging of Iran. He is also angling for a Nobel peace prize.
It is painfully obvious that Netanyahu does not know which way to jump, so, as is his wont, he plays for time. But the deadline for the end of the first phase of the three-stage agreement looms large. When that is reached, the ceasefire will, in theory, become permanent, and Israeli troops will fully withdraw from Gaza. Many on the right are determined that will not happen. Ben-Gvir and Smotrich want the war to resume. Any hitch or snag, for example in the scheduled release of 33 hostages in the first phase, could be used as a reason for reneging on the entire deal.
Political difficulties in Israel are mirrored on the Palestinian side. It is uncertain who, if anyone, will govern Gaza if and when Israeli troops leave. The outgoing US president, Joe Biden, has proposed an interim administration overseen by the Palestinian Authority (PA), which nominally controls the West Bank, assisted and funded by other Middle Eastern states. But Hamas remnants are still active in parts of Gaza, and Hamas and the PA have long been at odds. Many Palestinians view PA leaders as corrupt stooges. There is scant confidence they can rise to the challenges ahead.
Ironically, given the scale of Israel’s depredations over the past 15 months, security in Gaza is now a key concern. What little aid that has got through has often come under attack from armed looters. The agreement allows for a surge in aid deliveries to 600 trucks a day, below the prewar norm but nevertheless a vast improvement. This will help stave off famine. Yet Israel is still at odds with the UN’s Palestinian aid agency, Unrwa. Housing and infrastructure, electricity, water and sewage systems, hospitals and schools have been so devastated that it will be hard to move beyond daily emergency assistance.
The immediate and longer-term challenges facing the international community are daunting, too. It’s unclear whether Trump will maintain the push for peace; Netanyahu says the US leader has promised more weapons if the truce fails. In any case, Netanyahu, defying the UN, the EU and Arab neighbours, may deliberately re-ignite the conflict if that best keeps him afloat. Like most Israelis, he rejects a two-state solution. After 7 October, any move in that direction would be widely seen as rewarding terrorism. But US hopes of integrating Israel with the Arab world ultimately depend on its acceptance of a Palestinian state. The Saudis, in particular, insist on nothing less. How to square this circle?
As this fragile process gets under way, the parties to the conflict should use the pause for much-needed reflection. Hamas and its supporters must recognise that the 7 October atrocities produced even greater, counter-productive violence against other defenceless civilians – in Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon. Israelis and their leaders must recognise that the disproportionate, illegal use of force has trashed the country’s reputation, brought accusations of war crimes and genocide, and raised the issue of Palestinian statehood to the top of the global agenda. Both sides must accept the obvious: violence does not work.
The western democracies, led by the US, must recognise, meanwhile, that the international rules-based order of which they are inordinately proud failed utterly to prevent, and is still struggling desperately to contain, one of the worst political, security and human rights catastrophes since 1945. All concerned should take this rare opportunity to think again.
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