While the US attempts to solve its missile stockpile crunch with cheap, easily mass-produced missiles, China’s production surge forces a stark reckoning with modern warfare’s industrial and attritional realities and the race to outgun near-peer adversaries.
This month, The War Zone reported that General Atomics has unveiled a new low-cost air-to-surface missile, dubbed the “Strike Missile,” at the Surface Navy Association’s annual symposium.
The missile, developed by General Atomics’ Electromagnetic Systems Group, features an air-breathing propulsion system with a single ventral intake and a slab-sided design with two lugs on top, with no clear indications about its size, performance and other specifications from the company.
The US military’s focus on cost-effective, mass-producible munitions like the Strike Missile reflects an urgent need for scalable, long-range capabilities in high-end conflicts. Similar initiatives, like the US Navy’s Multi-Mission Affordable Capacity Effector (MACE) and the US Air Force’s Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM), highlight a broader effort to balance capability with affordability.
In addition to those projects, in September 2024, Asia Times reported that Anduril Industries, a US defense contractor, has introduced the Barracuda family of Autonomous Air Vehicles (AAVs) to address the critical depletion of US weapon stockpiles.
The Barracuda series, designed for economical, hyper-scale production, comprises the Barracuda-100, Barracuda-250, and Barracuda-500. These air-breathing, software-defined expendable AAVs are compatible with various payloads and deployment mechanisms and have varying sizes, ranges, and payload capacities.
The Barracuda-M configuration offers a cost-effective, adaptable cruise missile capability, thereby addressing the imperative requirement for precision-guided munitions (PGMs) that are both producible and upgradeable for the US and its allies.
The Barracuda AAVs are engineered for rapid, low-cost assembly, necessitating fewer tools and parts, resulting in a 30% reduction in cost compared to their competitors. Their modular design enables rapid adaptation to new technologies and evolving threats, utilizing commercially derived components to enhance supply chain resilience.
These relatively cheap and easy-to-produce missiles may have been conceptualized after recent US Navy operations in the Red Sea. These operations exposed the prodigious quantity of expensive missiles needed to neutralize the threats posed by a technologically inferior force, such as the Houthis in Yemen.
The vast expenditure of missiles in US Navy operations against Houthi rebels raises the question of whether the US can stockpile enough missiles in a near-peer conflict against China in the Pacific.
Illustrating the massive expenditure of pricey munitions against low-cost targets, The War Zone reported in July 2024 that the Dwight D Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group (IKECSG) expended 770 missiles and munitions targeting Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen during a nine-month deployment.
According to the report, the IKECSG launched 155 Standard-series missiles and 135 Tomahawk cruise missiles, while its aircraft deployed 60 air-to-air missiles and 420 air-to-surface munitions.
Scaling up such numbers in a hypothetical war with China, a January 2023 report by Mark Cancian and other writers for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank noted that in three to four weeks of conflict with China, the US expended about 5,000 long-range precision missiles, mainly the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM).
Given the prodigious scale of missile expenditure in a hypothetical war with China in the Pacific, it is questionable whether the US defense industrial base is up to keeping the US supplied with such firepower. The challenge lies in overcoming entrenched issues in production capacity, supply chain vulnerabilities, and bureaucratic inefficiencies.
A June 2021 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report outlines the challenges of the US defense industrial base in ramping up missile production. Despite rising demand due to global conflicts and evolving threats, the US industrial base is constrained by aging infrastructure, limited production capacity, and supply chain vulnerabilities.
Current PGM programs involve complex technologies such as GPS, laser and inertial navigation systems, requiring specialized components and skills.
The proliferation of potent anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems by adversaries like China and Russia, such as the HQ-18 and S-500 surface-to-air missiles, further stresses the need for longer-range and higher-precision munitions. Budgetary pressures and the long timelines of developing and fielding new munitions compound these challenges.
A March 2024 CSIS report by Seth Jones and Alexander Palmer highlights that China’s defense industrial base has shifted to a wartime footing, with rapid advancements in the production of weapons systems, particularly PGMs, to prepare for a potential conflict with the US.
For four consecutive years, China has launched more ballistic missiles for testing and training than all other nations combined, with its arsenal rapidly growing in both quantity and sophistication. In contrast, US munitions such as the LRASM and Tomahawk face shortages exacerbated by limited multiyear procurement strategies.
As the US races to close its missile firepower gap with China, innovative solutions like General Atomics’ Strike Missile represent a step in the right direction. However, overcoming the entrenched challenges of limited production capacity, aging infrastructure, and bureaucratic inefficiencies will require more than technological advances.
Without significant reforms to its defense industrial base, the US risks ceding its strategic advantage in the Pacific—a risk it can ill afford. The question remains: Can the US retain its role as the “arsenal of democracy” in 21st-century great power competition?
